The notion of Identity-Based Online/Offline Encryption (IBOOE) was recently introduced by Guo, Mu and Chen in FC 2008. In an IBOOE system, the encryption is split into online and offline phases. The offline phase is performed prior to the arrival of a message and the recipient's public key (or, identity 
Introduction
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) is a public key cryptsystem where any arbitrary string such as an email address or a telephone number can be utilized as a valid public key. The corresponding user private keys can only be computed by a trusted third party called the Private Key Generator (PKG) (who possesses a master secret key). The notion of identity based cryptography was first proposed by Shamir in 1984 [10] . This notion was later extended to IBE (e.g., [1, 3, 6, 12] ). In a traditional IBE scheme, there is only one PKG that distributes private keys for users. To improve the efficiency of key generation, Horwitz and Lynn first introduced the notion of Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) in [9] . HIBE is a generalization of IBE that mirrors an organizational hierarchy. In an HIBE system, there is a root PKG who has a master secret key, some domain PKGs, and users. The domain PKGs and users are all associated with their ID which are arbitrary strings. Root PKG generates a private key for the top-level domain PKG. The lower-level PKG requests a private key form their parent domain PKGs. Users ask for their private keys from their domain PKGs. It is noticed that several efficient HIBE schemes were proposed in [1, 2, 8, 11] with or without random oracles.
Recently, Guo, Mu and Chen [7] introduced the notion of identity-based online/offline encryption (IBOOE). The basic concept of online/offline encryption lies in splitting the encryption algorithm into two phases, the first phase is performed offline prior to the arrival of a message to be encrypted and a public key (identity ID). The second phase is performed online after knowing the message and ID. The online phase is typically very fast and the offline phase is designed to handle the most costly computation. This scheme is particularly useful for weak devices that do not have sufficient computation capacity.
In this paper, we extend the IBOOE to the Hierarchical Identity-Based Online/Offline Encryption (HIBOOE) and describe how to construct an HIBOOE scheme where the public key is a multi-tuple vector of domain identities. Although the IBOOE [7] scheme from Boneh-Boyen IBE can be extended to HIBOOE in a trivial way, the construction unfortunately results in a longer ciphertext and multiple modular computations in the online phase. In this paper, we construct a much more efficient HIBOOE from another HIBE [2] , which was proposed by Boneh, Boyen and Goh in 2005 to construct the constant ciphertext of HIBE. Our HIBOOE scheme performs very efficiently in the online phase which requires two modular computations only and has a shorter ciphertext with k + 4 elements (where k is the length of the public key), compared to k + 1 modular computations and 2k + 3 elements of ciphertext length from the Bonen-Boyen HIBE. Different to the HIBOOE construction from the Boneh-Boyen HIBE scheme, the original security proof for [2] is no longer adapted to our HIBOOE scheme. Therefore, we give a new security proof in the selective identity model in order to support our construction.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide the definitions of IBE/HIBE, including security requirements. In Sections 3, we present our HIBOOE scheme from the Boneh, Boyen and Goh's HIBE (BBG-HIBE) scheme. We give a comparison in Section 4 and conclude our paper in Section 5.
Preliminaries

Security models
An IBE system is composed of the four randomized algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt for master params and master secret key generation, private key generation, encryption and decryption, respectively. An -HIBE has a family of key-generation algorithms 
IND-sID-CCA Model.
We describe the indistinguishable selective-identity chosenciphertext attack model as follows:
Initialization:
The adversary outputs an identity ID * to be challenged.
Setup:
The challenger inputs a security parameter 1 k , and then runs the algorithm Setup. It gives the adversary the resulting master public parameters denoted by params and keeps the master secret key to itself.
Phase 1:
The adversary makes queries q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q m , where q i is one of the following:
• Key generation query on ID i where ID i = ID * and ID i is not a prefix of ID * . The challenger responds by running algorithm KeyGen to generate the private key d IDi and sends it to the adversary.
• Decryption query ID i , C i . The challenger responds by running algorithm KeyGen to generate the private key d corresponding to ID i , running algorithm Decrypt to decrypt the ciphertext C i using the private key d and sending the result to the adversary.
These queries may be asked adaptively according to the replies of queries.
Challenge: Once the adversary decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length plaintexts M 0 , M 1 on which it wishes to be challenged. The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sets C = Encrypt(params, ID * , M b ). It sends C as the challenge to the adversary.
Phase 2:
It is the same as Phase 1 but with a constraint that the adversary makes a decryption query on C i = C for ID * or any prefix of ID * .
Guess:
The adversary outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b = b.
We refer to such an adversary A as an IND-sID-CCA adversary. We define the advantage of adversary A in attacking the scheme E as 
Bilinear Map
Let G and G 1 be two cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G. A map e : G × G → G 1 is called a bilinear map if this map satisfies the following properties:
• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1.
• Computability: It is efficient to compute e(u, v) for all u, v ∈ G.
Complexity Assumption
We briefly review the -Decisional Bilinear DiffieHellamn Inversion ( -DBDHI) problem and -Weak Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellamn Inversion ( -wDBDHI) problem [1, 2] . (
Definition 6
We say that the (t, , )-wDBDHI (*) assumption holds in (G, G 1 ) if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least in solving the -wDBDHI (*) problem in (G, G 1 ).
Definition 7 Let y
where the probability is over the random choice of generators g, h in G * , the random choice of α in Z * p , the random choice of T ∈ G * 1 , and the random bits consumed by B. We refer to the distribution on the left as P wBDHI * and the distribution on the right as R wBDHI * .
HIBOOE from BBG-HIBE
Construction
Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p and let e : G×G → G 1 be a bilinear map. We assume that public keys (that is, identities ID) at level k are vectors of elements
The j-th component corresponds to the identity at level j. If necessary, we extend the construction to public keys over {0, 1}
* by first hashing some components {I j | 1 ≤ j ≤ k} using a collision resistant hash H : {0, 1} * → Z * p . We also assume that the messages to be encrypted are elements in G 1 . The HIBE system works as follows: Setup: To generate system parameters for an HIBE of maximum level , select a random generator g in G * , a random a ∈ Z p , and set g 1 = g a . Next, pick random elements g 2 , g 3 , h 1 , · · · , h ∈ G. The public parameters and secret master-key are params = (g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , h 1 , · · · , h ) ,
KeyGen(d ID , ID): To generate a private key
k of depth k ≤ , using the master secret, pick a random r ∈ Z p and output
Note that d ID becomes shorter as the depth of ID increases. The private key for ID can be generated incrementally, given a private key for the parent identity
be the private key for ID k−1 . To generate d ID , pick a random t ∈ Z p and output
The private key is a properly distributed private key for
Encrypt(params, ID, M ):
We refer to the original BBG-HIBE as general encryption. It is not required in our HIBOOE, but since our HIBOOE decryption is associated with the BBG-HIBE, we outline the scheme as follows:
General Encryption: To encrypt a message M ∈ G 1 under the public key ID = (
Online/Offline Encryption: We now describe our HI-BOOE, which is divided into two phases:
-Offline Encryption: Choose random s, β, α 1 , · · · , α ∈ Z p , and output
Store the offline parameters C of , β −1 , α 1 , · · · , α for the online phase.
-Online Encryption: Given a message M ∈ G 1 and the public key ID = (
k , and output
where
Observe that the online phase has a very low computational complexity and the offline phase dose not require the knowledge of the message and the public key (ID) of a recipient. The length of ciphertext is k + 4(k ≤ ), which is acceptable since the parameter is limited.
Dencrypt(d ID , C):
We describe our HIBOOE decryption and general decryption in this phase.
We then have
, which is the same as the output of the general encryption described earlier in this section and the message can be recovered with the general decryption procedure as below.
General Decryption: We refer to the decryption process of the original BBG-HIBE as general decryption. Consider an identity ID = (I 1 , · · · , I k ). To decrypt a given ciphertext C μ = (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ) using the private key
Indeed, for a valid ciphertext, we have
Security
We show that our HIBOOE scheme is selective identity secure (IND-sID-CPA) under the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion assumption. As mentioned in Section 2.3, we use a slightly weaker assumption called the Weak DBDHI * . 
(a +1 ) ) or from R wBDHI * (where T is uniform and independent in G * 1 ). Algorithm B's goal is to output 1 when the input tuple is sampled from P wBDHI * and 0 otherwise. We do not give the proof in detail here, due to the limitation of the length of the paper. Contact the authors if needed.
Chosen Ciphertext Security. Canetti [5] provided a general method of building an IND-sID-CCA secure -HIBE from an IND-sID-CPA secure ( + 1)-HIBE. A more efficient construction is given by Boneh and Katz [4] . Applying these methods to our HIBOOE construction results in IND-sID-CCA secure -HIBOOE for arbitrary .
Comparison
In a conventional HIBE, some components of ciphertext could also be pre-computed (naturally split an encryption into online/offline phases), but it is inefficient. Our HIBOOE scheme is much more efficient. We provide a comparison of computational cost in Table 1 . Let "E" denote the exponentiation in G, "ME" denote the multiexponentiation in G, "M " denote the modular computation. It's clear that the algorithm "M " is much faster than "E". We also assume that the message is encrypted under the public key ID = (I 1 , · · · , I ) ∈ (Z * p ) . 
Conclusion
In this paper, we extended the notion of Identity-based Online/offline Encryption to Hierarchical Identity-Based Online/Offline Encryption (HIBOOE) and proposed an efficient scheme, which is useful for devices with limited computational power. Our HIBOOE construction from BBG-HIBE [2] is provably secure without random oracles. In the encryption phase, the offline phase encryption can be run without the message to be encrypted and the public key (or ID) of a recipient and the online phase encryption is extremely efficient with only two modular computations.
